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GENERAL PREVENTION

-

ILLUSION OR REALITY?

Johs Andenaes
The author is Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure at the University of Oslo,
Norway, President of the Norwegian Assoiation of Criminalists, and Chairman of
the Social Sciences group in the National Research Council. The paper has been
read before the Norwegian Association. It is a stimulating approach to a subject
which, unfortunately, is too often considered threadbare. The author makes it
obvious that we need to reexamine some of our ideas about "severe" and
"humanized" punishment.-Emoro

The trend in penal reform in the past two generations has pointed in
the direction of wider scope for individual prevention (specific prevention). As a result, the prosecuting authorities and the courts have
through the years had an ever wider choice of sanctions put at their
disposal, adapted to the personality of the offender. We now have special methods of treatment for juvenile delinquents, abnormal offenders,
habitual criminals, vagrants, and alcoholics. These methods have been
developed partly within and partly outside the framework of the penal
system; hence they are partly punitive and partly non-punitive in nature.
The catchword for the whole development is the well-known saying of
Frantz von Liszt: It is not the crime but the criminal that is to be
punished.
It would be an exaggeration to say that this development has proceeded without opposition. But the opposition has been far weaker than
might be expected, inasmuch as most of those who consider the generalpreventive function of penal law to be the core of the punitive system
have felt they could make these concessions without any great danger.
But now and then conflict becomes apparent. It is especially among
doctors and prison administrators that we often note great skepticism
toward the belief in general prevention. Sometimes we see general prevention characterized as little better than a figment of the imagination,
a fiction used by jurists as a defense for their traditional rules and concepts. "I shudder," says the Danish physician, Tage Kemp, director of
Copenhagen University's Institute for Hereditary Biology," when I
think what this essentially fictitious concept has cost us, in terms of thousands upon thousands of wasted, bitter man-years of imprisonment-and
how many lives it has ruined which could just as well have been saved.
We lose much of our belief in the need for general prevention if, instead
of looking upon the criminal cursorily, thinking in terms of dry, unrealistic legal formalism, we think in more individualistic terms, as indicated
by the latest research in criminology and social biology."
Most jurists take a more positive attitude toward general prevention.
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Some go so far as to regard the general-preventive function as the only
possible argument to support both punishment and the awarding of
damages. Lundstedt is a good representative of this view; he in turn
attacks the idea of individual prevention. "The idea that punishment
aims at adjusting the criminal to society is surely one of the most fantastic to be found even in scholastic jurisprudence," he once wrote with
an outspokenness characteristic of his style. "Experience teaches us
that punishment has exactly the opposite effect on the criminal. Punishment has a natural tendency to demoralize the convicted person, and it
frequently shunts him over to a class of social outcasts."
Even if there are not many who would go so far as Lundstedt, we can
see jurists motivating their decisions with considerations of general prevention practically every day. This applies especially to lawmaking. In
the premises to the Norwegian Penal Code of 1842 it is clearly stated:
"The Theory of Deterrence, which in fact forms the basis for our present legislation . . . [appears] to be the main factor to be borne in mind
in determining the nature and magnitude of punishments"-but as a secondary purpose there should also be consideration for the effect of
punishment on the individual criminal, "in so far as attainment of the
primary object permits this." The Penal Code of 1902 and the special
laws passed in connection with it represent in many respects a victory
for individual prevention. The father of the new law, Bernhard Getz,
said in a lecture on the reform before the Norwegian Association of
Criminologists that its aim was to "set up a whole system of institutions
by which the state can seek to combat crime at its source or upon its
manifestation in a manner adapted to each age group and category of
crime." Notwithstanding a broader range of vision today than a century
ago, I do not think I go far afield in maintaining that it is a primarily
preventive consideration-having an eye to what is necessary to keep
the people reasonably law-abiding-which today's legislators have in
mind, too, when they define crimes and stipulate punishments. They
defer somewhat to individual prevention, to be sure, by permitting the
courts to set an appropriate punishment in each individual case.
General prevention often appears in judgments as well-especially in
situations new to the courts, when they feel a need to offer a deeper
explanation than simple reference to precedent.
The controversial question of, the general preventive effect of punishment, therefore, is not merely of theoretical interest: it has a very
practical side. And it is especially at the present time that it is important
to shed light on the problem. Economic and political developments are
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responsible for legislation's interfering in the individual's affairs in quite
a different way than previously-especially in economic matters. And
the cure-all for enforcing these rules is threat of punishment. Thus we
find a new category of offenses, whose social consequences can be even
more dangerous than the more traditional crimes, but which are not
regarded so in the public's moral judgment. Wherever legislation breaks
new ground in this way, it becomes vital to learn the answers to questions
like these: To what extent are we able to direct people's conduct by
threat of punishment? What are the prerequisites for an effective legal
prohibition? Can we, for example, maintain a prohibition which is not
sanctioned by the public's moral code? How important is magnitude of
penalty as compared with the risk of disclosure? What is the effect upon
general respect for law of the state's sustaining prohibitions that are
openly being disregarded?
It would be interesting to try to explain the reasons for the various
attitudes toward general prevention in the various professional groups
having contact with crime problems. It would require a rather extensive
investigation into the specific views and the grounds given for them. But
certain points are already evident. Prison officials and doctors naturally
regard it as their chief function to help the individual who has come into
conflict with the law to make a new start. By the emotional factor alone,
this means a tendency to put the main emphasis on individual prevention,
at the expense of the less tangible general prevention. The personal
tragedies produced by punishment that is unnecessary or undesirable in
terms of individual prevention can readily be perceived, while the indirect effects of punishment escape observation. Another point worth
noting is that prison officials and mental examiners are constantly coming
across cases where threat of punishment has been ineffective. It is
understandable that this constantly recurring observation can induce
skepticism as to the efficacy of threat of punishment. Where the mental
examiner is concerned, there is also the point that the picture of crime
he gets is dominated by the more or less abnormal personalities which
it is his lot to deal with. The lawyer, on the other hand, often has little
psychological insight and little acquaintance with the sort of persons
who most frequently come into conflict with the law. So he can easily
lose sight of the irrational factors in human motivation and construct
psychologically superficial explanations, based on a view that crime grows
out of conscious, rational consideration as to what is most profitable.
Such reasoning leads naturally to Feuerbach's formula of psychological
coercion: the risk for the lawbreaker must be made so great, the punish-
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ment so severe, that he knows he has more to lose than he has to gain
from his crime.
So it is easy to find explanations for our problem by referring to
the jobs and areas of experience of the different occupational groups.
But I believe the differences are a bit more apparent than real. Perhaps
they arise because the disputants attach different meanings to the terms
"general prevention" and "individual prevention." Or perhaps they
think of different types of offenders. The purpose of this paper is to
contribute to a tidying up of the discussion.
II
Before I start my exposition I should perhaps pause for a moment to
offer a precise definition of the concepts in question and their interrelationship.
By general prevention we mean the ability of criminal law and its
enforcement to make citizens law-abiding. if general prevention were
100 percent effective there would be no crime at all. General prevention may depend on the mere frightening or deterrent effect of
punishment-the risk of discovery and punishment outweighing the
temptation to commit crime. This was what Feuerbach had in mind
when he designed his famous theory of punishment as psychological
coercion directed against the citizen. Later theory puts much stress
on the ability of penal law to arouse or strengthen inhibitions of another
sort. In Swedish discussion the moralizing-in other words the
educational-functionhas been greatly stressed. The idea is that punishment as a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act
helps to form and to strengthen the public's moral code and thereby
creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime.
Unconscious inhibitions against committing forbidden acts can also
be aroused without appealing to the individual's concepts of morality.
Purely as a matter of habit, with fear, respect for authority or social
imitation as connecting links, it is possible to induce favorable attitudes
toward this or that action and unfavorable attitudes toward another
action. We find the clearest example of this in the military, where
extended inculcation of discipline and stern reaction against breach
thereof can induce a purely automatic, habitual response-not only
where obeying specific orders is concerned, but also with regard to
general orders and regulations. We have another example in the relationship between an occupying power and an occupied population. The
regulations set down by the occupier are not regarded by the people
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as morally binding; but by a combination of terror and habit formation
a great measure of obedience can be elicited-at any rate in response
to commands which do not conflict too greatly with national feelings.
We can say that punishment has three sorts of general-preventive
effects: it may have a deterrent effect, it may strengthen moral inhibitions
(a moralizing effect), and it may stimulate habitual law-abiding conduct.
I have reason to emphasize this, since many of those who are most
skeptical of general prevention think only of the deterrent effect. Even
if it can be shown that conscious fear of punishment is not present in
certain cases, this is by no means the same as showing that the secondary
effects of punishment are without importance. To the lawmaker, the
achievement of inhibition and habit is of greater value than mere
deterrence. For these apply in cases where a person need not fear
detection and punishment, and they can apply without the person even
having knowledge of the legal prohibition.
By individual prevention we mean the effect of punishment on the
punished. At best this results in genuine moral improvement or in
the acquisition of pro-social habits. Here the contrast to general prevention is quite clear. The same holds where the punished is rendered
harmless-for good, by means of capital punishment or banishment, or
temporarily by means of definitive prison sentences. In other cases the
effect on the convict is simple deterrence, without any change in
character being induced. When a motorist is fined $5.00 for illegal parking he is neither improved nor rendered harmless, but he will presumably be more careful the next time he parks. Thenceforth the
motorist's thinking in such situations will be influenced both generalpreventively and individual-preventively. The detefrent effect which the
law by itself has on every citizen will be strengthened in his case by
the fact that he knows from personal experience that the law means what
it says.
The disagreement over the importance of general prevention is of
course largely due to the fact that its effectiveness cannot be measured.
We do not know the true extent of crime. In certain areas of crime
there is reason to believe that the figures available for offenses which are
prosecuted and punished corresponds roughly to the true incidence of
crime. In other areas recorded crimes represent only a small fraction
of the true incidence. We know still less about how many people would
have committed crimes if there had been no threat of punishment.
There is a certain lesson to be drawn from the events following upon
changes in the law or in other circumstances important to general prevention-such as police efficiency. We can also get somewhere by the

1952]

GENERAL PREFENTION-ILLUSION OR REALITYP

use of common sense and psychology. But even so, it can hardly be
denied that any conclusion as to the real nature of general prevention
involves a great deal of guesswork. Claims based on the "demands of
general prevention," therefore, can often be used to cloak strictly retributive demands for punishment or mere conservative resistance to
change. On the other hand, it is just as possible that the importance
of general prevention is seriously overlooked by those who are mainly
interested in a more efficacious treatment of the individual offender.
On the other hand we might also ask, what do we really know about
the individual-preventive effect of punishment? We have figures on
recidivism to tell how large a proportion of ex-convicts commit new
crimes. Yet, even aside from the significant error that comes from the
fact that figures on recidivism only cover cases where the ex-convict is
caught committing a new crime, the figures can tell us nothing of how
great the recidivism would have been if there had been no punishment,
or a different punishment. We might compare recidivism according to
the different methods of treatment-e.g. recidivism after the use of
probation or recidivism after use of special non-penal measures, as
opposed to recidivism after ordinary punishment. But the results
can hardly be sure, because the different methods of treatment will
always be applied against different sorts of law-breakers. If the most
promising of these are selected for probation and their recidivism
figures are better than others', this is no proof that probation is superior
in terms of individual prevention. (If the result were the opposite,
however, there would be grounds for more concrete conclusions). On
the whole we can say that recidivism statistics are no more useful in
measuring the individual-preventive effect of punishment than the
ordinary crime statistics are useful in measuring its general-preventive
effect. Both in an evaluation of individual prevention and of general
prevention we can resort only to judgment based on psychology, practical experience and common sense.
III
In our attempt to get a better understanding of the problem, it is
of primary importance that we should not take all crime together but
take each important group of crimes separately. One reason why the
discussion on general prevention is often so fruitless, and why there
is such sharp disagreement is, in my experience, that the protagonists
generalize too much. They talk about general prevention in the general
case, yet tend to draw from experience they have gained in particular
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areas. This is, in fact, a common error in jurisprudence: on the basis
of a limited material a theory is built to cover a much wider area than
is logically justified. Psychological attitudes vary markedly in the
different categories of law-breaking, and they can also vary markedly
in the various groups and strata of the society. As obvious as it is
that it is impossible to do a criminological study throwing together
thieves and murders, rapists and usurers, swindlers and thugs, it should
be just as obvious that a study of the general-preventive effect of punishment must also be differentiated. In a short paper like this it is of course
not possible to give any more than samples from selected areas.
1) I shall begin with a group of crimes which play a modest role in
the literature but which have a good deal of practical importance and
are good for illustration, all these police regulations which are such
commonplaces in modern times: traffic ordinances, building codes, laws
governing the sale of alcoholic beverages, regulations governing commerce, etc. Here there is no doubt that punishment for infraction has
primarily a general-preventive function. Here nearly all of us are
potential criminals. A public-spirited citizen has, of course, certain
inhibitions against breaking laws and regulations. But experience shows
that moral and social inhibitions against breaking the law are not
enough in themselves to insure obedience, where there is conflict with
one's private interests. Thus the extent to which there can be effective
enforcement by means of punishment determines to what extent the
rules are actually going to be observed. As an example of rules which
are just about 100 percent effective, because one must count on detection
and punishment of all infractions, we can take blackout regulations
during war. Deterrence alone suffices here, even without support of
the moral authority which the law usually has. Consider a blacked-out
city in an occupied country. The occupier's order has no moral authority
at all--on the contrary, he is the enemy and must be resisted. But even
so, hundreds of thousands of families take great care each night to
prevent the least crack of light from showing. As if guided by an unseen
hand, these countless householders go into action as soon as darkness
falls. No one defies the order, because everyone knows that there is
not enough to be gained to make the risk worthwhile. And eventually
it becomes a habit, which is followed automatically, practically without
thought. It would be hard to find a more impressive example of the
"terror effect" of the threat of punishment under favorable circumstances.
It is not hard to find examples of the opposite: regulations which are
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not observed because there is no punishment of offenders against them.
The Danish state prosecutor, Jorgen Trolle, has described the problem
presented by Danish tourists to Sweden in an article in Ugeskrift for
Retsvcesen, 1947 (Weekly Law Review).' There were no restrictions
on travel to Sweden, although one could only buy a one-way ticket, not
round trip. It was forbidden to take Danish or Swedish money out of
Denmark, and this was strictly enforced; travelers were even searched
occasionally. It was forbidden to borrow money in Sweden, and any
assets already there were to be called home. The logical conclusion,
says Trolle, was that traffic would be minimal, comprising only those
few who could persuade the National Bank to sell them some Swedish
currency or who had close and prosperous relatives in Sweden. But on
the contrary, we witnessed great hordes, some days up to several
thousand, crossing over to Sweden and returning laden down with
goods. The travelers were so numerous that the customs officials and
police had to throw up their hands. They checked to see if the travelers
had tobacco or other highly dutiable items, but they did not bother to
ask how they had got the Swedish money.
Trolle observes that "although everyone knows that the great
majority of the numerous travelers who cross the Sound with a passport issued by the Ministry of Justice and on a ship belonging to the
Ministry of Transport are lawbreakers, infringing Ministry of Trade
regulations, nevertheless the customs officials, who are subject to the
Ministry of Finance, and the police, who are subject to the Ministry
of Justice, do nothing."
His conclusion is as follows: "It is unjust that the less law-abiding
portion of the population should have advantages which the more
conscientious ones are deprived of. And it taxes respect for law that
everyone and his brother can see and can draw the lesson that one can
with impurity allow oneself a wide margin in observing the law."
This is a good example of how undesirable it is to pass laws which
cannot be enforced. It is a common failing in legislation. It is so
natural to resort to threat of punishment when the authorities decide
they want to channel the citizen's actions in one direction or another.
The legislators probably realize that many will break the rules but
reason that many will observe them, so that something, at least, will be
gained. Looked at from the point of view of the individual administrative branch, this can be valid enough, but if the reasoning is followed
1. Just after the war Sweden was a land of plenty compared to Denmark, and some
Danes used to take the two-hour boat trip across the Sound to buy scarce commodities. In
the Swedish vernacular they became known as "locusts." (transl.)
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first in one area and then in another, it can hardly fail to demoralize
respect both for the law and for public authority. It makes sense,
therefore, that certain thinkers have warned against this "inflation in
the administration of criminal law."
I have cited two examples above to show the two extremes. In most
cases the efficiency of law enforcement lies btween them. How strict
the enforcement must be to effect a reasonable degree of general prevention, a reasonable degree of obedience in a given area of administration,
depends on many factors-including, how much a person stands to gain
by breaking the law and from which strata of the society the lawbreakers are recruited. For example, it makes a difference that it is
not the same sort of people who break parking regulations and who
break the regulations against drunkenness in public places.
2) The example of Danish tourists to Sweden has taken us, strictly
speaking outside the area of true police regulations and into a new area,
which we can call economic crimes. I do not mean primarily the traditional crimes against property like theft, embezzlement, fraud and receiving stolen goods-I shall come back to these later. I refer here
to crimes against governmental regulation of the economy: price violations, rationing violations, unlawful foreign exchange transactions,
offenses against workers protection, disregard of quality standards, and
so on. Psychologically we can also put customs and tax evasion in this
group, although logically these crimes belong in the fraud category.
In time of war and crisis economic crime of this sort can have immense
importance to the nation. Outside Scandinavia we have drastic examples
of the entire distribution of foodstuffs being disrupted because the goods
find their way onto the black market. From postwar Germany, for
instance, we have heard how the starving urban population roamed the
countryside carrying their family treasures, with the hope of bartering
a little food for themselves-food which the farmers withheld from
the controlled channels of distribution. Even under fairly normal
conditions, however, the political trend in Western Europe seems to be
in the direction of more public control of the economy. If the trend
continues, the problem of making these controls effective will become
a paramount question in penal law-indeed, a question of far greater
dimensions than the sort usually discussed in criminological circles.
For whatever our opinion may be on the question of free versus controlled economy, there is no denying that ineffective regulation is the
worst arrangement of them all.
Psychologically the economic crimes tend to be rather clear-cut.
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A large number of the people who are affected by economic regulations
or by the levying of taxes and fees feel no strong moral inhibition
against infraction. They often find excuses for their behavior in political
theorizing: they oppose the current government's regulative policies;
they find taxes unreasonably high; and they find support for such views
in their newspapers, which daily represent the state as a great vampire
and governmental agencies as business enemy number one. Yet the
matter of obedience or disobedience can often have important economic
consequences. It is to be expected that many will calculate in cold blood
the risk of being caught, and act accordingly. It is rather significant
that a Norwegian religious newspaper of January 1949 carried an
article with roughly the following headline: "Time for Taxpayers to
Prepare their Annual Evasion." In this area, at any rate, Feuerbach's
law of general prevention has a certain validity: it is necessary that
consideration as to the risk involved in breaking the law should outweigh consideration of the advantages to breaking the law. The amount
of threat needed varies greatly, of course, from person to person. One
is a timid, cautious type; another likes to take chances. One has a social
position he is afraid to lose; another has no such fear. Generally speaking, the biggest crimes in this area are committed by people with a
certain economic and social position, people who can be deterred by
even a rather modest risk of detection and punishment. When they
break the law nevertheless, it is because they reckon it as overwhelmingly probably that all will go well.
In this connection we might consider what happened upon the calling
in of paper money and the forced registration of bank accounts and
securities in Norway in 1945.2 Enormous values came to light which
had previously escaped assessment. In some districts only a small
percent of the actual bank holdings had previously been declared. On
the basis of the registration we can almost lay down the rule that
everyone was a tax evader who could be so without risk. The result
is striking confirmation of what we could have inferred by ordinary
psychological reasoning: the importance of policing to the enforcement
of penal provisions. If there were such policing as to produce a risk
of 25 percent in making false tax declarations, tax evasion on a grand
scale would be practically eliminated.
From this reasoning I draw the following significant conclusion: in
2. This was a measure, also resorted to in other European countries, to flush out illgotten gain from the war. The idea was that all liquid assets would have to be declared,
and the tax authorities and investigators for economic treason would be able to trap profiteers-since the alternative to declaring the assets was to let them become worthless.
(Transl.)
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discussions on the introduction of new economic regulations, the question of the feasibility of effective enforcement should occupy a central
place. And if it is found that such policing is not feasible, that the
law will in effect reward dishonesty, the lawmakers should think twice
and three times before legislating it-no matter how fine it looks on
paper.
3) When we come to the traditional crimes against property, the
picture is a bit more complicated. Strong moral and social inhibitions
against the criminal act appear alongside regard for the penal code.
Now the question is: are not these moral and social inhibitions enough
in themselves to keep most people from committing thefts, frauds, and
so on? And then: will these moral and social inhibitions retain their
strength if the risk of punishment is removed? Is not the methodical
use of punishment or other forms of reaction as an answer to such infractions of the law one of the most important factors in arousing the
public's taboo attitude toward them?
The question here is not whether you or I would remain law-abiding
even if there were no "switch behind the back." The question is
whether there is not a fairly large group on the moral borderline who
might go wrong, and whether they might not in turn draw others with
them. What we are concerned with is, of course, a long-term process,
where the full effect of a weakening in the judicial reaction to crime
will not be felt before the passage of a generation or more.
In discussing these questions we must not overlook the fact that
for numerically important groups, especially in the cities, the social
reaction against crime means little, because the moral standard in these
groups is too low to be of account. Likewise we must not overlook
the fact that the social reaction is connected in many ways to the judicial.
This means not simply that general behavior with regard to a category
of acts is affected by the law's attitude toward them: but also that
it would be much easier to keep one's acts secret and thus avoid all
social reprobation, if one did not have to consider the risk of their
being brought to public notice through criminal prosecution.
The exceptional conditions that prevailed during the German occupation have given us new and valuable experience, even if it must be
evaluated cautiously.
In Denmark the Germans arrested the entire Danish police force
in September 1944. During the rest of the occupation the policing was
done by an improvised and unarmed watch corps, which was all but
ineffectual except when the criminal was caught red-handed. Jorgen
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Trolle headed the Copenhagen state prosecutor's office at the time, and
in an extremely interesting book, Syv Maaneder uden Politi (Seven
Months without Police), he has described what happened. The crime
rate rose immediately, but there was wide discrepancy here between
the various types of crime. While in the whole of 1939 only ten cases
of robbery were reported in Copenhagen, the figure by 1943 had risen
to ten a month, as a result of wartime conditions. After the action
against the police the figure quickly rose to over 100 a month and continued to rise. Theft insurance benefits quickly rose ten-fold and more.
The fact that punishment was greatly increased for criminals who
were caught and brought before the court could not prevent this. Crimes
like embezzlement and fraud, where the perpetrator is generally
known do not seem to have increased notably.
As Trolle points out, every big city has its quota of underworld types
who will exploit the opportunity given them by a crippling of the law
enforcement system. In the next round new circles will be drawn into
crime, weak persons who are tempted when they see crimes go unpunished. The experiment in Denmark was imperfect and of short duration.
What would happen if the state's punishing function were discontinued
completely and for a rather long period can only be guessed. My own
opinion is that such a complicated mechanism as a modern industrial
society can hardly be kept going without police and penal courts. The
gangster syndicates in America between the first and second World
Wars show how powerful organized crime can become, when conditions
are right for it. Just imagine what would have happened if the state
had not stepped in resolutely with police, penal courts and other measures, so that the gangs would have had free play: the individual lawabiding citizen would have been helpless, not only against the existing
gangs, but against any newcomer who wanted to equip himself with a
revolver and try his luck. If we carry the reasoning further, we can
imagine how the big gangs would have found it profitable to divide the
country among themselves, hauling in money by assessing the population
and in return providing it with a certain security by cracking down on
upstart competitors. There were actually strong tendencies in this
direction. The existing society would have succumbed, and a new one
would have risen to take its place-this would have corresponded remarkably to the Marxist definiti6n of the state as a power combination
whose purpose is to safeguard the ruling class' exploitation of the
oppressed I
The Danish experiment is instructive, but such a radical crippling of
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law enforcement will hardly be experienced under normal conditions.
To illustrate the way demoralization spreads as a result of slack law
enforcement under more normal conditions, I can refer to something
that happened here in Norway a number of years ago and caused a
small sensation. There had been thieving from a military arsenal over
a fairly long period of time. It ended finally in violence, as a watchman was shot and killed by two boys caught in the act of breaking in.
Now the police got busy; there were house searches and many arrests.
Great quantities of stolen goods were recovered. According to newspaper accounts, whole truckloads of stolen military goods were rounded
up-weapons, ammunition, radio sets, telephone equipment, fur coats,
tarpaulins, searchlights, saddles, uniforms and helmets. And here I
quote a newspaper report based on information given by the police and
concluding with an analysis into the cause of the thefts:
There is no escaping the fact that the thefts were entirely due to poor guarding.
The boys all say they heard from comrades how easy it was to steal from the
arsdnal, and so they went out and tried it. It is characteristic that most of the boys
know the names of the two 'watchdogs,' and that none were afraid of them. The
lax guarding at the main arsenal became known to all the boys; when some tried
to break in, and it went well every time, the thieving gained momentum.
Such a development is no rarity. The process is as follows: Some begin
to steal because it is easy and safe. Others hear about it and try their
luck, too. The bigger the group implicated, the less each individual in
it is able to feel he is doing anything wrong. In the above case it was
a question of state property, to boot, which people seem to have
comparatively little respect for. But it would hardly have made any
great difference if the stores had belonged to a private firm instead.
4) When we look at moral offenses, we find there are entirely different
factors to be dealt with. The urge for economic gain is a universal
motive for crime, even if its intensity varies from case to case. Practically no one can claim to be entirely immune to the temptations of
Mammon. Many sex offenses, on the other hand, grow out of abnormal
or unharmonious sexual adjustments. Homosexuality, exhibitionism, sexual assaults on children, incest, and the like, have no appeal for the
normal personality. The scope of general prevention is thus here
limited to those few people who because of their sex impulses are
especially vulnerable. At the same time, these acts are strongly disapproved socially, so that mere anticipation of discovery affords a
powerful deterrent. And because the acts are determined by sex
impulses, often being performed as outlets for strong mental tensions,
the psychological mechanism is quite different from that at work in,
for instance the economic crimes which I have discussed above.
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For this and for other reasons, sex offenses belong in the area of
crime where there is reason to be somewhat skeptical about the generalpreventive validity of threat of punishment. It might be noted, incidentally, that the amount of rape and other sex offenses did not appear to
increase particularly during the policeless period in Copenhagen. It
is hard to calculate, however, what the effect of slackness in enforcement would be in the long run. In all probability the effect would be
quite different for the different offenses. In some countries, such as
France, incest is usually unpunishable. Whether this has had any
influence on the prevalence of incest cannot, of course, be determined
with any exactness. But there is at least nothing to indicate that such
intercourse has become a commonplace. That rape, on the other hand,
is a crime not alien to the normal human personality, can be verified in
times of war and occupation. In an occupation army where discipline in
this matter is lax, the incidence of rape is commonly high. If discipline
is strict, on the other hand, as with the German army of occupation
in Norway during the war, the crime hardly ever occurs.
5) The reader probably expects me to take up murder next. To
mystery story writers-and often to criminologists as well-murder
is the crime par excellence. Criminology is mainly the study of murder.
But in the every-day administration of justice in Scandinavia murder
plays an extremely modest role. In the decade 1931-1940, 43 persons
were convicted of first degree murder in Norway, or four to five per
year, about one-tenth of a percent of all criminal convictions. And motivation varies so markedly that it is impossible to evaluate the effect of
criminal law in this area without further differentiation than there is
space for here. The holdup man who kills simply for gain, the sex
murderer whose crime assuages the darkest drives of his sick mind, the
uxoricide who seeks desperate relief for a mental torment that is more
than he can bear-there is a world of difference between these types;
all they have in common is the juridical name for the act. I could hardly
do better here than quote Stephens' famous words of 1863:
Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed
murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they
regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that
murderers are hanged with the hearty approbation of all reasonable men.
6) A similar difficulty greets us as we attempt to evaluate the
general-preventive usefulness of threatening punishment for rebellion,
treason and other political crimes. There can be little doubt that the
provisions against treason, for example, have a certain moral weight
in emphasizing the extremely reprehensible nature of treason and there-
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by inducing an attitude of repugnance toward oneself committing the
crime; but here as elsewhere the effect is not really ascertainable. It is
also noteworthy that the risk element can even attract the opportunist
who coldbloodedly calculates which course of action will be most
profitable. On the other hand, it is often said that threat of punishment has no effect on the "genuine" political criminal, who is impelled
by belief in the justice of his cause. That can be true enough for some,
but hardly for the great mass of people to whom such political movements direct their appeal. To take an example from nineteenth-century
Norwegian history: the prosecution of Marcus Thrane-the socialistic
agitator whose remains have only recently been returned to Norway
from America to be interred with full official honors-completely crippled the movement he had founded. The labor movement's later
progress had nothing to do with this pioneer movement. From the
dictatorships of our own times we know that it is possible for a brutal,
relentless police system to eliminate all organized resistance to the
regime. By accompanying the political trials with a vigorous propaganda, it may also be possible to induce a conviction in the people that
such resistance is morally wrong. I am of course not proposing that
these examples be followed: I mention them simply to show that punishment can be a deterrent and a moral force in this area as well.
It must be admitted, of course, that these uses of penal provisions
are highly dependent upon the political balance of power, and on many
other circumstances. During an enemy occupation threat of punishment against traitors will have little weight for those who feel certain
that the occupier will win the war. And in certain cases-e.g. after a
civil war-it can happen that prosecution of the rebels will not increase
respect for the state's authority, but indeed perptuate a split, in a way
that can have serious repercussions. In such cases it can become difficult
for the lawmakers to decide which is wiser: to overlook the crime by
resorting to a partial or general amnesty, or to hold the guilty ones
responsible to the fullest extent of the law.

IV
Up to now I have intentionally avoided the question, in what way
the general-preventive effect depends on the nature and magnitude of
the reaction. In some respects this is the most immediate side of the
problem. The magnitude of punishment is a factor which the lawmakers and the courts can regulate as they see fit, while it is harder
for them to vary the other factors that are important-notably the
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intensity of policing and the set of mind of the public. The simplest
way to make people more law-abiding, therefore, is to increase the
punishment. When a certain type of crime threatens to get out of
hand-blackout infringements or black market trading in wartime,
for instance-the authorities often resort to stiffening the penal provisions. And when the courts are faced with the question of general
prevention, they usually regard the choice as one between severe and
light sentences in the individual case.
The best known example in modern Norwegian experience of such
reasoning is the increased punishment for sex offenses called for in the
penal code revision of 1927. The motive for the change was primarily
general-preventive. The reasoning was the sex offenses were becoming
more numerous, and this was thought to be due to laxness on the part of
the courts. But the effect of the change as reflected in crime statistics
was astonishing. Instead of the decline in sex offenses that was expected,
there was a notable rise. Comparing the five-year period before the
change with the five-year period after the change, the average rose from
136 sex crimes per year to 229, or a rise of 68 percent. In the following
years the figure has remained at about this level.
The example hardly tells us much about the general-preventive effect
of threat of punishment, but it does show how careful we must be in
drawing conclusions from the ordinary crime statistics. The figures
for other crimes remained fairly constant in these years, and regardless
of what we may think of the efficacy of harsh sentences in preventing
crime, we certainly cannot conclude that they increase it. The explanation for the rise in incidence must be that this group of crimes now received more attention than before. The discussion and agitation that
went with the revision and the stricter view that the new provisions
gave expression to, doubtless caused many sex offenses that would not
have been reported before to be reported now-and perhaps the police
now investigated such cases more energetically, as well. That this
must be the explanation is supported by a glance at a breakdown of
the statistics on sex offenses: the rise is found overwhelmingly in the
types of cases that one would assume would often go unreported or
unsolved-e.g. illicit relations with girls 14 to 16 years old.
If we think first of the purely deterrent value of threat of punishment
-and with certain penal provisions this is the main point, as we have
seen-it is clear that deterrence depends not simply on the risk of being
punished, but also on the nature and magnitude of punishment. How
important this factor is depends on the characteristic motivation for the
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crime, and on many other circumstances. Magnitude of punishment
should mean more for crimes usually committed after careful consideration pro and con (e.g. tax evasion or smuggling of foreign currencies) than for crimes which grow out of emotions or drives which
overpower the individual (e.g. the so-called crimes of passion). Another
point is the moral condemnation attached to the deed. If this is strong,
the magnitude of punishment is of minor importance. The social position of the potential criminal, incidentally, is also a factor. Embezzlement, for instance, is a crime which is often committed by persons
in responsible positions and having some social prestige. To the
respectable cashier, fear of detection is more fear of shame and
scandal, and economic and social ruin, than it is fear of the punishment
itself. Such a view is certainly alien to the bootlegger, however, for
whom threat of punishment is just one of the risks of the trade.
That maximum deterrence does not follow from the severest punishment even Orsted, the great Danish legal thinker of a century ago,
was able to point out, in his treatise "On the First Rules of Criminal
Law." He shows how a penal system which the citizens and the administrators themselves regard as cruel will lead them to hold a protecting hand over the criminal rather than to cooperate in bringing him
to justice. "With general enmity toward the penal code, it will lose its
force, and impunity will be the real consequence of the law's always
threatening the most severe punishment." Modern experience-e.g.
the tendency of the jury to acquit when it fears that a verdict of guilty
will mean too severe punishment for the defendant-confirm the correctness of Orsted's reasoning.
Turning next to the moral, the educative value of punishment, we
find that magnitude of punishment is of importance here too. Punishment is an expression of society's disapproval of the act, and the degree
of disapproval is expressed by the magnitude of punishment. A serious
crime must be answered with a severe punishment, a minor misdemeanor
with a lenient reaction. But here it is rather a question of the relative
severity of the punishment than of its absolute magnitude. The humanizing of penal law in the past generations has led to a marked lowering
of the general level of punishment. What was punishment for a minor
crime a century ago is today punishment for a major crime. So long
as this development does not take place faster than the public has a
chance to adjust its ideas on appropriate punishment, it need have
little effect on the ability of punishment to express society's disapproval.
It is the same as with marks in school: the same mark can be expressed
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on a scale from 1 to 2 as on a scale from 1 to 6 or on one from 1 to 100.
But a transition from one scale to another can cause some confusion.
A question of practical importance in this connection is: can the law
influence the public's attitude toward a group of punishable acts by
changing their position on the marking scale? In other words, by
increasing the punishment for a group of crimes can we not only increase its deterrent effect but also increase the moral inhibitions
against them? It is impossible to say for sure. Personally I think it
probable that such an influence can occur in certain areas and to a
limited degree, but that it is at best a long-term proposition. A deterrent effect can be achieved quickly; a moral effect takes longer.
These views on the relationship between general prevention and the
magnitude of punishment are built upon abstract reasoning. No doubt
there are some skeptical readers who are impatient to ask: can you give
any practical examples in which the magnitude of punishment has had
influence on its general-preventive effect?
It must be admitted at once that only very little support for the
proposition is to be educed from experience-in the first place because
the general-preventive effect is always hard to ascertain, and second
because there has never been a systematic gathering of material which
could illuminate the question. I believe I can, however, give a few
examples by way of illustration.
Normally it cannot be shown that it makes any difference to crime
whether death or life imprisonment is the maximum penalty which
can be imposed.3 But that there are situations in which the death
sentence can have a distinctly different effect than other punishments
became apparent during the occupation. The great majority of the
people came to feel that it was nationally and morally right to sabotage
the occupation authorities. Thus no social opprobrium went with being
arrested for illegal activity-quite the contrary. And toward the end
of the occupation, when the duration was being reckoned in weeks and
months, even the threat of life imprisonment became just a question
of short internment. The only thing that could really worry a member
of the underground was the thought of torture or death. I remember
3. In Dano-Norwegian legal history there is one remarkable example of the death penalty
being abandoned because in a certain type of crime it defeated its purpose. It was done in
the Ordinance of December 18, 1767, which replaced the death penalty with penal servitude
for life in cases where "melancholy and other dismal persons [committed murder] for the
exclusive purpose of losing their lives." The background for the provision was, in the
words of Orsted, "the thinking that was then current among the unenlightened that by
murdering another person and thereby being sentenced to death, one might still attain
salvation, whereas if one were to take one's own life, one would be plunged into eternal
damnation." (Eunomia, Part III, p. 147).
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so well the day in October, 1942, when the Reichskommissar issued
his ordinance promising death for having any traffic at all with illegal
newspapers. There were many that day who got to work tidying up
their effects, and the production and distribution of illegal newspapers
suffered a serious setback. It was not long, however, before people
realized that the ordinance was not to be taken seriously, and activity
was resumed. Experience during the war also showed how the risk
affects people differently according to their individual attitudes and
sensitivity to danger. A large share of the population was unwilling to
take any risk-they were against the Germans, to be sure, but their main
consideration was their own pockets. Another large share was willing
to take part in illegal work where the risk was small, and especially
where they would not be risking their lives. A third group, numerically
smaller and the heart of the resistance movement, was not to be
deterred at all by risk.
All this is of a certain practical value in planning the treatment to
be accorded revolutionary movements whose members can be assumed
to have about the same attitude toward the lawful authorities as the
majority of the Norwegian people had toward the Germans during
the occupation. In their recent proposal for a revision of the treason
and rebellion paragraphs of the Penal Code, the Norwegian Penal Code
Commission has described what might happen if an armed rebellion
should be started while the international situation is tense: "If the
rebellion is not at once suppressed, it can easily lead to intervention
by a foreign power. Then the situation might arise where there is
reason to think that a death sentence against a leader of the rebellion
is the only way to bring others to their senses and thereby win mastery
of the situation for the lawful authorities."
Another practical example of the preventive value of heavy punishment is enactment of a rule in Norway calling for prison sentences
without access to probation in cases of drunken driving. The subject
is so familiar that it hardly requires elaboration. Most Norwegians are
able to see on looking about their own circle of friends that it is becoming
more common to leave the car at home when going to a party at which
alcohol is likely to be consumed. There is unquestionably a certain
preventive effect at work here. How great it is, and how it is distributed
over the different social groups among motorists, and whether it is
due simply to the deterrent effect or whether the law has succeeded in
bringing about a change in attitude toward driving while intoxicated:
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all this is something we have no exact knowledge of; it could well be
made the subject of a sociological study.
I have given a couple of examples of the effect of especially heavy
sentences. 4 The other side of the question is whether special leniency
to certain groups of offenders might not undermine respect for the law.
Attorney General Aulie, in his lecture on youthful offenders before
the Association of Norwegian Criminologists in 1947, touched upon
gangsterism, which is so typical in juvenile delinquency. He said:
We know from experience that when members of the gang are released after
questioning pending the winding up of investigation, the young people almost invariably flock back together, usually with the idea of planning new escapades.
They regard the intervention of the police as a temporary inconvenience, of negligible importance. They count on prosecution being waived for those with clean
records, or at worst their being given suspended sentences. And they have reason
to believe that a dozen or so new thefts on top of those already counted against
them will not make much difference if they are discovered.

If this observation is correct, it shows with all desirable clarity that
the humanizing of penal practice must be kept within certain limits if
it is not to lead to an undermining of respect for law and authority.
But it would take us far afield to go into this problem here.
V
With the last example I come to the relation between general and
individual prevention. Usually there is no great conflict between the
two. This is clearly the case when measures designed for individual
prevention go farther than punishment designed along general-preventive lines-such as in the case of forced labor for vagrants and alcoholics
or indeterminate sentences for recidivists. Such long sentences are of
course sufficient for deterrence. Neither are they objectionable from
the point of view of the moralizing function of punishment-at any
rate when it is clear to citizens that there is no question here of retribution for the crime but rather of a measure which aims to educate the
prisoner or render him harmless. There is greater objection from a
general-preventive point of view when individual considerations motivate an especially lenient treatment. But neither here should there be
any real danger, so long as the milder special treatment does not become
4. In discussion of this paper a participant (Police Chief Rode) cited as another example
of the significance for prevention of magnitude of punishment, his experience from smuggling
during prohibition. In his district, at least rumrunning was dealt a severe blow after the
courts began to adjudge prison sentences instead of fines. The effect was not alone deterrent: the change was important also to the public's attitude toward crime. Prison, as
opposed to fines, was regarded as shameful, and while smuggling had previously been
looked upon as a thrilling sport, which even "decent citizens" could engage in, it now
became something to stay away from.

JOHS ANDENAES[

[Vol. 43

such a commonplace that the potential criminal can count on it and
behave accordingly. Both the deterrent and the moralizing sides of
general preevntion are based primarily on the average reaction to
certain offenses. Waiving of prosecution and the use of suspended
sentence are so widely practiced that the conflict here has become acute.
More common than an out-and-out conflict between individual and
general prevention is the circumstance that a punishment that is necessary for general prevention is often superfluous for individual prevention. In certain crimes there will practically never be an individualpreventive need for punishment-or at any rate, not a severe punishment: such things as perjury (so few persons are called in as witnesses
more than once in a lifetime), or bigamy.' In other cases the circumstances governing the behavior of the individual offender may lead
to the conclusion that punishment is not needed for his benefit-"that
execution of the sentence is not necessary to prevent the offender from
committing new crimes," to quote the Penal Code's §52 on conditions
for probation.
Thus the judge is often put in a difficult position. A single judgment
has, to be sure, seldom any concrete effect on general prevention. The
question is: would general prevention be significantly impaired if it
became the practice to apply probation or minimum sentence in similar
cases? Something else to think about is whether people are likely to
learn of the decisions and let their conduct be guided by them.
This problem came up in a treason case after the war.5 A young man
was charged with having served in the German army-in itself a serious
crime, meriting several years at hard labor. In this case, however, the
circumstances were unusual. The defendant, who was still under 20, was
arrested by the Germans during the war and put into a concentration
camp as a hostage for his mother, who had fled to Sweden. He felt depressed while in the camp and hit on the idea of getting out by
volunteering for German war service and then escaping. He had, in
fact, heard of people getting out in this way. He volunteered and was
accepted, but for a while he was unable to escape. He was sent to
Germany and then to serve six months at the front. But when he
came home on leave at the end of 1944 he seized the opportunity to
flee to Sweden.
In the lower court the defendant was sentenced to one year and put
on probation. The majority in the Supreme Court, however, reversed
the probation. The writer of the majority opinion held that for the
5.

The NORWEGIAN CASE REVIEW, (Norsk Reistidende), 1946, p. 854.
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sake of precedent it was indefensible to let a person who had been guilty
of such a desperate act as to join the enemy's army get by with a suspended sentence. The reasoning is psychologically a bit unrealistic.
One justice dissented, holding that the use of probation in a single case
which is dearly different from the majority of cases cannot be said to
weaken the future preventive value of the reckoning with Norway's
traitors. "This would presuppose knowledge in the future not only of
the general lines of the present reckoning, but of its details-a knowledge which is theoretically possible in isolated cases, but which in my
opinion can be disregarded in practice."
VI
More than 70 years ago Lombroso wrote his famous book, L'Uomo
delinquente, based on a study of prisoners in Italian penal institutions.
Not many of his conclusions have stood the test of time. Most have
been rejected as fanciful hypotheses and untenable generalizations. But
he was a pioneer in his use of the empirical method in investigating the
causes of crime. Psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists and others
have continued his work. An enormous body of empirical data has been
amassed to aid in appraising lawbreakers' physical and mental traits,
family conditions, economic position, and so on. As a result every
generalizing theory has had to be abandoned. The time for broad
slogans in criminology has passed.
No comparable empirical study of the pschology of obedience to law
has been undertaken. In a word, we are .still in the pre-Lombrosian era
in this field. And the discussion often gives way to cock-sure general
statements like "I believe (or I do not believe) in general prevention."
Much has been written about general prevention; much talented effort
has been spent in exploring its operation and importance. But the empirical data are still lacking. If any attempt has been made to include it
at all, it has usually--as in this paper-occurred by the use of chance
observations, plus ordinary psychological theories. I believe we can
make some progress in this way. But we shall not have firm ground
to stand on before a systematic investigation is made into the effect of
penal law and its enforcement on the citizen's behavior, and into the
interrelation between the legal system and the other factors which
govern behavior. 6 This task is in a sense much more difficult than the
6.

A limited investigation of this type is SCHMIDT, GRANTZE and Ross, WORK AND VACAAGRICULTURAL LABORERS.
A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1946; in
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one Lombroso undertook. He had his material nicely collected and
concentrated for him in the state prisons. One who wishes to study
general prevention, on the other hand, must examine the whole population. Therefore it is a field for sociologists and psychologists. And it
is difficult for one uninitiated into sociological methods of research
to judge how the work should be tackled, or how far it is at all possible
to go. I, at any rate, do not feel qualified to enlarge on the matter for
the time being. But in this paper I have tried to point out how important
these problems are.

